Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2006

Salt Lake County v. Utah Labor Commission and
Steven A. Alexander : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David E. Yocom; T.J. Tsakalos; counsel for petitioner.
Alan L. Hennebold; Utah Labor Commission; Brian Kelm; counsel for appellees.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Salt Lake County v. Utah Labor Commission, No. 20060233 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6329

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SALT LAKE COUNTY,
Petitioner/Appellant
Case NO.20060233-CA

v.
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION and
STEVEN A. ALEXANDER,
Respondents/Appellees

Labor Commission No.03-0089
Priority 7

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STEVEN A. ALEXANDER
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM ORDER OF THE
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

Mr. DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
Mr. T.J. TSAKALOS
Deputy District Attorney
2001 South state Street #S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (801) 468-2698
Counsel for Petitioner

Mr. Alan L. Hennebold
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
Post Office Box 146600
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600
Telephone: (801) 530-6937
Counsel for Utah Labor Commission
Mr. Brian Kelm
350 So. 400 East, Suite 122-W
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-9009
Counsel for Steven A. Alexander

RESPONDENT RESPECTFULLY REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT
AND THAT THIS CASE BE REPORTED.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SALT LAKE COUNTY,
Petitioner/Appellant
Case NO.20060233-CA

v.
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION and
STEVEN A. ALEXANDER,
Respondents/Appellees

Labor Commission No.03-0089
Priority 7

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STEVEN A. ALEXANDER
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM ORDER OF THE
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

Mr. DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
Mr. T.J. TSAKALOS
Deputy District Attorney
2001 South state Street #S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (801) 468-2698
Counsel for Petitioner

Mr. Alan L. Hennebold
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
Post Office Box 146600
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600
Telephone: (801) 530-6937
Counsel for Utah Labor Commission
Mr. Brian Kelm
350 So. 400 East, Suite 122-W
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-9009
Counsel for Steven A. Alexander

RESPONDENT RESPECTFULLY REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT
AND THAT THIS CASE BE REPORTED.

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS
Page

Table of Authorities

ii

Jurisdiction of the Court

1

Statement of the Issues and Standard of Review

1

Determinative Statutes and Rules

3

Statement of the Case

4

A. Nature of the Case

4

B. Course of Proceedings

4

C. Statement of the Facts

5

Summary of Argument

9

Argument
I.

THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED
LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL
DOUBTS AS TO COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR
OF THE INJURED WORKER

10

PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF THE LABOR COMMISSION ORDER AND THUS HAS
FAILED IN ITS DUTY ON APPEAL

12

RESPONDENT WAS IN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF HIS
EMPLOYMENT WHEN INVOLVED IN A CAR ACCIDENT

15

A. The "Going and Coming" Rule

15

B. Police Officers on Call

17

Conclusion/Statement of Relief Sought

30

Addendums

32

II.

III.

TABLE

OF

AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Page

AE Clevite. Inc. v. Labor Commission. 996 P.2d 1072 (Utah Ct. App. 2000)
cert. den. 4 P.3d 1289 (UT 2000)

16

Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp..73 P.3d 315 (Utah, 2003)

19, 20

Askrew v. Industrial Commission. 391 P.2d 302 (Utah, 1964)

10

Baker v. Industrial Commission. 405 P.2d 613 (Utah, 1965)

10

Bailey v. Industrial Commission. 398 P.2d 545 (1965)

17

Bernard v. Motor Vehicle Division. 905 P.2d 317 (Utah App., 1995)

2

Botke v. County of Chippewa. 533 N.W. 2d 7 (Mich. App., 1995)

25

Cambelt International Corp.v. Dalton. 745 P.2d 1239 (Utah, 1987)

13

Carillo v. Workers Compensation Appeals Board. 197 Cal. Rptr. 425,
149 Cal. App. 3d 1177 (Cal. App., 1983)

27

Chambo v. City of Detroit. 269 N.W. 2d 243 (Mich. App., 1978)

25

Chandlery. Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919)

10

Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82, 100 P. 3d 1177 (Utah, 2004)

14

City of Sherwood v. Lowe. 4 Ark. App. 161,
628 S.W.2d 610 (Ark. App., 1982)
City of Springfield v. Industrial Commission.

26

614 N.E. 2d. 30 (III. App., 1993)

24

Drake v. Industrial Commission. 939 P.2d 177 (Utah, 1997)

17

Esguivel v. Labor Commission. 7 P. 3d 777 (Utah, 2000),
cert. den. 4 P. 3d 1289 (Utah, 2000)
ii

2

Featherstone v. Industrial Commission. 877 P.2d 1251 (Utah, 1994)

14

Hales Sand and Granite. Inc. v. Audit Division. 842 P.2d 887 (Utah, 1992) . . . 12
Heaton v. Second Injury Fund. 796 P.2d 676 (Utah, 1990)

10

J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission. 661 P.2d 949 (Utah, 1983)

10

John Collier v. County Nassau. 1974 NY 44576, 362 N.Y.S. 2d 52
(NY App., 1974)

26

Keams v. Industrial Commission. 713 P.2d 49 (1986)

1

Kahn Brothers v. Industrial Commission. 75 Utah 145, 283 P. 1054 (1929) . . . 17
Kinne v. Industrial Commission. 609 P. 2d 926 (Utah, 1980)

17

Large v. Industrial Commission. 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App., 1988)

3

McKesson Corp. v. Labor Commission. 41 P.3d 468 (Utah, 2002)

3

McPhie v. Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153 (Utah, 1977)

3,10

M & K Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 189 P.2d 132 (Utah, 1948)

10

Merriam v. Industrial Commission. 812 P.2d 447 (Utah App., 1991)

14

Mineral County v. Industrial Commission. 649 P.2d 728 (Colo. App., 1982). . . 27
Montgomery County. Maryland v. Wade.
690 A.2d 990 (Md. App., 1997)

21

Moser v. Industrial Commission. 440 P.2d 23 (1968)

17

Prows v. Industrial Commission. 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah, 1980)

10

Rogers v. Industrial Commission. 574 P. 2d 116 (Colo. App., 1978)

27, 28

Siens v. Industrial Commission. 418 N.E. 2d 749 (III., 1981)

24

State Insurance Fund v. Industrial Commission. 393 P.2d 397 (1964)

17

iii

State of Delaware v. Glascock. 1997 DE 18262
(Superior Ct., Sussex, 1997)

25

State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission.
685 P.2d 1051 (Utah, 1984)

3

Tiqhev. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept.. 877 P.2d 1032 (Nev., 1994)

23

Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305 (Utah, 1998)

13

Wade v. Stanql. 869 P.2d 9,12 (Utah App., 1994)

15

VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission.
901 P. 2d 281 (Utah Ct. App., 1995)
West Valley City v. Majestic Inventory Co..
818 P.2d 1311(Utah App., 1991)

16, 17
14

Whitear v. Labor Commission. 973 P.2d 982 (Utah App., 1998)
Wolland v. Industrial Commission. 434 N.E. 2d 1132 (III., 1982)

1,13
24

STATUTES

Utah Code Annotated § 34A-1-301 (1997)

2

Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-401 (1999)

2, 3

Utah Code Annotated. § 34A-2-801 (8) (1997)

1

Utah Code Annotated, § 63-46b-16 (1988)

1

Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1953, as amended)

1

RULES
Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
iv

1
13

TREATISE
Arthur Larson and Lex Larson, Larson's Workers Compensation Law §14.05[7]
(Rel. 83-11/99)
19

v

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This appellate review proceeding arises from the Utah Labor Commission's
February 22, 2005, Order awarding Temporary Total and Permanent Partial
compensation, medical expenses and attorney's fees arising out of an on-the-job
injury. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1953, as amended), Utah Code Annotated § 34A2-801 (8) (1997) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Has Appellant satisfied its obligation on appeal to marshal the
evidence in support of the Labor Commission's Order and show that, despite
supporting facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom that the
Findings are not supported by substantial evidence?
Standard of Review: This is a question of law. The Appellate Courts will not
overturn the Commission's factual findings unless they are "arbitrary and capricious,"
"wholly without cause", or without substantial evidence to support them. Kearns v.
Industrial Commission. 713 P.2d 49, 51. (Utah, 1986). Factual findings will not be
overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion is
permissible. Whitear v. Labor Commission. 973 P.2d 982 (Utah App., 1998).
Further, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, § 6346b-16(4)(g) (1988) provides that:
The Appellate Court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the
agency's record it determines that a person seeking judicial review has
l

been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
•**

(g). The agency action is based upon a determination of
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported
by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court.
Issue 2: Did Mr. Alexander's injuries arise in the course and scope of his
employment with Salt Lake County.
Standard of Review: Generally, "[Mjatters of statutory construction are
questions of law that are reviewed for correctness." Esquivel v. Labor Commission.
2000 UT 66, 7 P.3d 777 (Utah, 2000). The determination of the issue in this case,
however, does not merely involve statutory construction. Rather, the determination
requires an application of the terms of Utah Code Annotated, §34A-2-401 (1999) to
the particular facts of this case.
The Utah State Legislature has granted the Labor Commission "the full power,
jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the law. . ." to any
adjudicative proceeding before it. Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-301 (1997). When "the
governing statute makes an explicit grant of discretion to [an agency, the appellate
court] appl[ies] a reasonableness and rationality standard, and may only overturn the
[agency's] conclusions of law if they are unreasonable and irrational." Bernard v.
Motor Vehicle Division, 905 P.2d 317, 320 (Utah App. 1995).
In workers' compensation cases involving issues of mixed facts and law, the
Commission's Findings and Conclusions are entitled to great deference, and its
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Conclusions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. That is, whether
the Commission overstepped "the bounds of reasonableness and rationality" in
making that determination.
Therefore, the Court will not overturn the factual findings in such a workers'
compensation case, "unless they are arbitrary and capricious, or wholly without
cause, or contrary to the one [inevitable] conclusion from the evidence." McKesson
Corp. v. Labor Commission. 41 P.3d 468, 473 (Utah, 2002), quoting from Large v.
Industrial Commission. 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah App., 1988).
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope of the Utah
Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize that the Act is to be liberally
construed and any doubt as to compensation is to be resolved in favor of the injured
worker. E.g., State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission. 685 P.2d 1051.1053
(Utah 1984); and McPhie v. Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153,155 (Utah 1977).
Preservation for Appeal:

Respondent acknowledges that the issue of

whether Mr. Alexander's injuries occurred in the course and scope of his
employment was raised by Petitioner before the Utah Labor Commission. A Petition
for Review was timely filed with this Court.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULE
Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-401 (1999) is the applicable statute. It provides
in relevant part that workers' compensation benefits shall be paid to:
An employee ... who is injured ... by accident arising out of and in the
course of the employee's employment...
3

The Statute is set forth in full in Addendum "A" hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:

The Petitioner seeks review of the Utah Labor

Commission's Order finding Mr. Alexander entitled to workers compensation benefits
as the result of an automobile collision which occurred in the course and scope of
his employment.
Course of Proceedings: On January 28, 2003, Mr. Alexander filed an
Application for workers' compensation benefits sustained as the result of an
industrial injury on November 7, 2001. (R1 at 1). Salt Lake County, his employer,
filed an Answer to the Application on February 27, 2003. (R1 at 10-11). Notice of
Hearing was sent to all parties on July 1, 2003 setting Mr. Alexander's claim for
Hearing on October 23, 2003. (R1 at 12).
On April 16, 2004, Administrative Law Judge Debbie L. Hann entered her
Findings of Fact and Interim Order referring the case to a Labor Commission
Medical Panel on the issue of the medical cause of Mr. Alexander's right shoulder
condition. (R1 at 43-49).
On June 2, 2004, the Medical Panel issued its report finding that there was a
"medically demonstrable causal connection between the Petitioner's (Mr.
Alexander's) right shoulder condition and the 7 November 2001 industrial accident."
The Panel gave him a 3% whole person impairment as a result of that injury. (R1
at 54-67). Neither party filed any objections to the Medical Panel Report.
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On February 22,2005, ALJ Lorrie Lima entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order finding that Mr. Alexander did suffer an injury arising out of and in
the course of his employment. She awarded him Temporary Total and Permanent
Partial compensation as well as medical expenses, travel allowances, interest and
attorneys fees. (R1 at 83-91).
Salt Lake County filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Labor Commission
on March 21, 2005 (R1 at 92-154).

The Appeals Board of the Utah Labor

Commission entered an Order Denying Motion for Review on February 15, 2006.
(R1 at 174-179). A full and complete copy of that Order is contained in Addendum
"B" herein.
A Petition for Review was filed by Salt Lake County with this Court on March
13,2006.
Statement of Facts: The relevant facts in this matter are simple,
straightforward and not really disputed by the parties. A complete, detailed and
largely unchallenged Statement of Facts is contained in the Appeals Board of the
Utah Labor Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review, dated February 15,
2006, (R1 at 174-179); See a/so, Addendum "B".
1. On November 7,2001, Mr. Alexander was employed by Salt Lake County
as a Lieutenant in the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, (he was, in fact, a 28 year
veteran of the Sheriffs Office), where he supervised the Detectives Division. (R3 at
25-26). He was on-call day and night, seven days a week, for investigation of
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homicides and other major crimes. (R3 at 27). Even when off-duty, he was required
to respond to calls, as well as responding to crimes committed in his presence. (R1
at 83, R3 at 35).
2. As part of his employment, an unmarked Sheriffs vehicle was issued to Mr.
Alexander, as well as certain other law enforcement officers, "for use in the
performance of their duties." The County policy allowed officers to use their Countyowned vehicles for personal travel, subject to some restrictions. (R1 at 36-41). The
County provided all fuel, maintenance and repair for the vehicles. A copy of Salt
Lake County's Rules and Regulations governing the use and responsibilities for such
vehicles is attached hereto in Addendum "C."
3. The County required that its off-duty officers be on 24 hour call and they
were required to respond to crimes committed in their presence, police calls and
other emergencies. (R1 at 38). Mr. Alexander had actually used his County-owned
vehicle several times during off-duty hours to engage in law enforcement activities
such as traffic stops and officer back-up. (R3 at 34).
4. Salt Lake County benefited from its policy of assigning County vehicles to
certain Sheriff Officers by having an increased number of Officers on the streets,
faster response and, in general, increased police availability, including the benefit
of sometimes having an unmarked car on the road. (R1 at 45).
5. The Sheriffs vehicle was unmarked but was, nevertheless, fully equipped
as a police car with a siren, forward and back deck lights and a police radio that
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turned on automatically when the ignition was started. (R3 at 61). The vehicle was
also equipped with a loaded M-16 rife, 12 gauge shotgun and Mr. Alexander's
personal side arm. (R3 at 32-33). In addition, Officers were required to keep in their
vehicles and carry with them at all times, their Sheriffs Officer identification and/or
badge, a uniform, citation book, flashlight and flares. (R1 at 37).
6. On November 7,2001, Mr. Alexander and his wife were northbound on 1-15
at 12300 South, in Salt Lake County, in Mr. Alexander's Sheriffs vehicle. (R1 at 83,
R3 at 28). Earlier that day, he had driven his wife to a medical appointment and he
was now driving her to work in Salt Lake City, and from which he intended to drive
to his workplace. (R3 at 35). He was dressed in his work clothes (he is not a
uniformed deputy), and had his Sheriffs Office jacket and badge. (R3 at 61).
7. On route to Salt Lake City, on 1-15, Mr. Alexander stopped his vehicle due
to slow traffic. He quickly observed that the driver behind him would not be able to
stop in time to avoid colliding with the rear end of his vehicle. He removed his right
hand from the steering wheel and placed it in front of his wife so that she would not
hit the dashboard. He kept his left hand on the steering wheel and braced himself
for impact. (R3 at 29-30).
8. The other vehicle did forcibly strike with the rear of Mr. Alexander's vehicle
and his wife was knocked unconscious and was non-responsive. He called for an
ambulance on his Sheriffs vehicle's radio. (R3 at 30).
9. He timely reported the motor vehicle accident to his employer, the County,
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and his resulting sore shoulder, which had began to hurt immediately after the
collision. (R3at36).
10. Following the car wreck, Mr. Alexander's wife had stroke like symptoms
caused by a tear in her brain stem. She underwent considerable medical treatment.
(R1 at 86, R3 at 38-40).
11. Medical causation of Mr. Alexander's injuries was ultimately not disputed
following Labor Commission Medical Panel findings. The Panel noted that there was
a medically demonstrable causal connection between Mr. Alexander's right shoulder
condition and the November 7, 2001, car wreck. The Panel further found that the
treatment Mr. Alexander received for his right shoulder condition subsequent to the
accident was reasonable and necessary. (R1 at 87). Neither party filed any
Objections to the Medical Panel Report. Accordingly, the nature and scope of Mr.
Alexander's medical treatment is not at issue herein and is omitted from this
Statement of Facts.
12. The County controlled officers' use of the County's vehicles in several
ways. Under the official, written policy (R1 at 36-41, See also. Addendum "C")
Officers were required to:
(A).

Monitor the police radios in their vehicles and respond to law
enforcement situations, whether on-duty or off-duty. In fact, the
vehicles had been modified so that the police radio automatically came
on when the ignition was turned on;

(B).

Keep their cars clean, orderly and properly maintained; and,

(C).

Carry firearms, police identification, a uniform, flashlight, citation book,
8

and flares in the vehicle at all times.
13. In addition, the County Policy prohibited Officers from:
(A).

Driving their vehicles outside Salt Lake County without prior
authorization;

(B).

Using the vehicle for any activities inconsistent with the officer's
obligation to respond to emergencies;

(C).

Allowing anyone other than a Sheriff's Office member to operate the
vehicle;

(D).

Using their vehicles for recreational or vacation trips;

(E).

Using their vehicle if the officer or any passengers had consumed any
alcohol within the previous six hours;

(F).

Transporting alcohol, except for official business;

(G).

Dressing "in any way that could bring discredit to the Sheriffs office, i.e.
tank tops, reversed ball caps, earrings, day old beards, etc." While offduty officers were permitted to have civilian passengers with them, they
were not permitted to respond to police calls with such passengers in
the car.

(R1 at 36-38, Addendum "C").
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Although the County argues Mr. Alexander was yet not formally on-duty at the
time of his automobile accident, the nature of his employment, his 24 hour on-call
status, the control that the Employer exercised over his use of the Employer owned
vehicle (during formally off-duty hours), together with the benefit which the Employer
received from his use of the vehicle, all warrant the award of workers' compensation
benefits to him.
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The Labor Commission Order granting workers' compensation benefits to Mr.
Alexander was reasonable and rational. While this is an issue of first impression for
this State, the vast majority of jurisdictions who have considered a similar fact
situation have awarded compensation.
ARGUMENT
I
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED
LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL
DOUBTS AS TO COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN
FAVOR OF THE INJURED WORKER.
Few principles of workers' compensation law are as well established in this
State as that workers' compensation disability claims are to be liberally construed
in favor of awarding benefits, and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be
resolved in favor of the claim. Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this principle
from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund. 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990);
J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission. 661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v.
Industrial Commission. 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. Industrial
Commission. 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977); Baker v. Industrial Commission. 405 P.2d
613 (Utah 1965); Askrew v. Industrial Commission. 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M
& K Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v.
Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919).
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra, first discussed the proper
construction of the Workers Compensation Act and the underlying purposes of the
10

Act, and stated as follows:
[0]ur statute requires that the statues of this state are to be
'liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and
to promote justice.'
* * * * * *

In this connection it must be remembered that the compensation
provided for in the act is in no sense to be considered as damages for
the injured employee or to his dependents in case death supervenes.
The right to compensation arises out of the relation existing between
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of [or] in the
course of the employment. Under such an act the costs and expenses
of conducting the business or enterprise, including compensation for
injuries to 'employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the whole cost
and expense of conducting the business as aforesaid is added to the
cost of the articles that are produced and sold, and hence, in the long
run, such costs and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such an act,
therefore, is to protect the employee and those dependent upon him,
and in case of his serious injury or death to provide adequate means for
the support of those dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in
case of total disability or death of the employee his dependents might
become the objects of public charity, such a calamity is avoided by
requiring the business or enterprise to provide for such dependents,
with the right of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the
cost of producing and selling the product of such business or enterprise.
The beneficent purpose of such acts are therefore apparent to all, and
for that reason, if for no other, should receive a very liberal construction
in favor of the injured employee. We are all united upon the proposition
that in view of the purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should be resolved in
favor of the employee or his dependents as the case may be. \± at
1021-1022. (Emphasis added).
The Labor Commission properly applied this principle and awarded benefits
to Mr. Alexander. The Petitioner, however, apparently wants to disregard the
preponderance of the evidence and facts and focus on an alarmist claim that:
The Commission's ruling presents serious liability exposure for any
11

employer who allows any employee to operate a work vehicle, no
matter on how limited a basis, on personal errands as long as the
employee monitors the radio (or listens for the cell phone's ring) or
carries work equipment or keeps a utility uniform on board, even for
example, when transporting his child and team mates to a game, and
regardless of the employee's testimony that he was not engaged in
work-related activity at the time of injury. (Petitioner's Brief at 7).
This case, and any ruling which this Court may subsequently enter, will be
limited to its fact situation, which is not even remotely similar to the parade of horrors
that Petitioner paints. When the facts of this case are reasonably applied to Utah
law, let alone given a "liberal construction in favor of awarding benefits," it is clear
that Mr. Alexander is entitled to workers' compensation benefits. As indicated below
the vast majority of other jurisdictions and commentators who have considered this
issue have come down in favor of compensation.
II
PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF THE LABOR COMMISSION ORDER AND THUS HAS
FAILED IN ITS DUTY ON APPEAL.
If Petitioner wishes to challenge the Labor Commission's Order, it is required
to marshal all of the evidence supporting the Agency's Finding and show that,
despite supporting facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom,
the Findings are not supported by substantial evidence given the record as a whole.
Hales Sand and Granite, Inc. v. Audit Division, 842 P.2d 887, 893 (Utah 1992).
The County has utterly failed to do so. Petitioner failed to even mention
significant Findings made by the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission.
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Many of those omitted Findings are pointed out in Respondent's Statement of Facts
above. Although Petitioner does devote a single brief paragraph to a section entitled
"Facts Supporting the Commission's Ruling" (Petitioner's Brief p. 8-9) that recitation
is not only incomplete, it also completely fails to all include the required "reasonable
inferences that can be drawn therefrom."
It is well-established that a party challenging a lower Court or Administrative
Agency's Findings of Fact has the burden of establishing that those Findings are not
supported by the evidence and thus, are clearly erroneous. See. Utah R. Civ. P.
52(a); Cambelt International Corp. v. Dalton. 745 P.2d 1239,1242 (Utah 1987). In
order to successfully challenge a Trial Court or Administrative Agency's Findings of
Fact on appeal, a Petitioner/Appellant must list all the evidence supporting the
Findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is inadequate to sustain the
Findings, when viewed in a light most favorable to the Court/Agency below. See.
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998).
Utah's Courts have stated that the marshaling process is not unlike being the
devil's advocate. A Petitioner/Appellant may not merely present selected evidence
favorable to his or her position without presenting any of the evidence supporting the
lower Court/Agency's Findings. See. Whitear v. Labor Commission. 973 P.2d 982
(Utah App., 1998).
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very
findings appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of
13

supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the
appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is
clearly erroneous.
West Valley City v. Majestic Inventory Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
Marshaling the evidence on an appeal is a process fundamentally different
from that of presenting their claims at the Hearing. As the Utah Supreme Court
explained in Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82,100 P.3d 1177 (Utah, 2004), in a recent,
extensive attempt to reiterate the requirements of marshaling:
Appellants cannot merely present carefully selected facts and excerpts
from the record in support of their position [citing cases]. Nor can they
simply restate or review evidence that points to an alternate finding or
a finding contrary to the trial court's finding of fact [citing cases].
Furthermore, appellants cannot shift the burden of marshaling by falsely
claiming that there is no evidence in support of the trial court's findings.
Id, at 1195.
The Court went on to emphasize that, "If the marshaling requirement is not
met, the appellate court has grounds to affirm the court's findings on that basis
alone" and "we assume that the evidence supports the trial court's findings." ]a\ at
1196. See also, Merriam v. Industrial Commission. 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991); Featherstone v. Industrial Commission. 877 P.2d 1251,1254 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994)
Rather than marshaling all the evidence in support of the Order, the Petitioner
has referenced only some of the relevant facts and asserts that this is merely a case
in which Mr. Alexander, a non-uniformed officer, was driving his police vehicle prior
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to work hours and on a personal errand and, therefore, the accident did not "arise out
of and in the course of employment" for purposes of workers' compensation benefits.
This is a very constrained reading of the "going and coming" rule, for which police
officers enjoy a notable exception.
When an Petitioner/Appellant fails to meet the heavy burden of marshaling the
evidence, the Appellate Courts are bound to assume the Record supports the Trial
Court/Administrative Agency's factual Findings. In fact, Appellate Courts have
shown no reluctance to affirm when the Appellant/Petitioner fails to meet its
marshaling burden. See, Wade v. Stangl. 869 P.2d 9,12 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
As a result of Petitioner's failure to adequately marshal the facts and evidence,
its Petition for Review should be dismissed. To rule otherwise would allow any party
on appeal to supplant Findings of the lower Court or Administrative Agency with that
parties' own purported Findings without marshaling evidence or meeting the
substantial evidence test.
Ill
RESPONDENT WAS IN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF HIS
EMPLOYMENT WHEN INVOLVED IN A CAR ACCIDENT.
A. The "Going and Coming" Rule.
It is not disputed, nor at issue herein, that injuries sustained by an employee
are generally not considered to arise out of and in the course of employment for
purposes or workers' compensation benefits, in the ordinary situation involving
traveling between home and the employment premises, without anything more
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involved. VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission. 901 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah App.
1995). That, however, is not the fact situation presented here.
The mere fact that an employee is going or coming to his or her work site
alone is insufficient to determine that he/she is not entitled to workers' compensation
benefits for an injury while so engaged. It is necessary to look beyond the mere
"going and coming" and determine the nature and purpose of the trip, the amount of
control the employer exercises, and any benefit which may have accrued to the
Employer.
Under Utah law, when the activity in which the employee is engaged
advances, directly or indirectly, the employer's interests, and the employee is at the
place and time where he or she is authorized to perform such activity, the employee
is entitled to compensation, even if that activity also advances the employee's own
interests, unless any benefit to the employer is negligible. (See cases cited below).
As this Court has explained, that means that the activity must be "[wjhile the
employee is rendering services to his employer which he was hired to do or doing
something incidental thereto, at the time when and the place where he was
authorized to render such service" and "An activity is incidental to the employee's
employment if it advances, directly or indirectly, his employer's interests." AECIevite
v. Labor Commission. 996 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah App., 2000), cert. den. 4 P.3d
1289 (UT 2000).
Examples of cases in which compensation is allowed in such situations are:
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clearing a driveway at home, VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission. Supra:
traveling between employer's business locations, State Insurance Fund v. Industrial
Commission. 15 Utah 2d 263,393 P. 2d 397 (1964); driving a semi-truck tractor from
home to the employer's business after cleaning and servicing the tractor at home as
was the employee's usual practice, Kinne v. Industrial Commission. 609 P. 2d 926
(Utah, 1980); starting a company truck to drive to the terminal after taking it home
for the night, Moser v. Industrial Commission. 21 Utah 2d 51, 440 P.2d 23 (1968);
driving the company vehicle to work where it would regularly be used, Bailey v.
Industrial Commission. 16 Utah 2d 208,398 P.2d 545 (1965); driving to a post office
to pick up the employer's mail before returning to the employer's premises after
lunch; Kahn Brothers v. Industrial Commission. 75 Utah 145, 283 P. 1054 (1929);
or driving toward home before dropping off materials at a location designated by her
employer (although not after the materials have been dropped off). Drake v.
Industrial Commission. 939 P. 2d 177 (Utah, 1997).
B. Police Officers on Call.
In this case, both an Administrative Law Judge and the Labor Commission
determined that based upon the facts presented to them at the Hearing, that
although Mr. Alexander was not formally on-duty at the time of his automobile
accident, nevertheless, he was engaged in actions to materially benefit his employer
and that such activities create a proper basis for an award of compensation as was
made in this case.
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Petitioner claims that:
The Commission has carved out a new exception to the 'coming-andgoing rule,' in effect ruling that police officers' injuries arising from
automobile accidents involving an agency vehicle are sustained as an
accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment.
Petitioner's Brief at 7.
Nothing could be further from the case and Respondent Alexander has not
advocated such a blanket rule. Although Petitioner cites a prior Labor Commission
case (Ross v. Salt Lake City Corporation. Labor Commission Case No. 2003-0958)1
which did award workers' compensation benefits to an off duty Salt Lake City police
officer who was involved in an accident with her agency vehicle, there is nothing to
indicate that the Labor Commission has adopted a blanket and hard and fast rule
awarding workers' compensation benefits to any off duty police officer who is injured
while driving a police vehicle. Rather, both the Ross case and this

case

demonstrate that the Labor Commission looks at the facts of each case and
analyzes those facts to determine whether they meet the legal standard for an injury
"arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment."
Petitioner, in its Brief, cites Professor Larsen's well respected treatise on
Workers Compensation law for the principle that an employee generally is not
covered by workers' compensation benefits while going and coming to his/her place
of work. (Petitioner's Brief at 16). Inexplicably, however, Petitioner fails to continue
1

Now on appeal as Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Commission. Case No. 20050774-CA. Oral
argument was held was held before the Utah Supreme Court on this case on June 6,2006, and a decision
is pending.
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to cite the treatise for the law and public policy on the specific fact situation raised
in this Petition for Review.
Professor Larsen went on to note that the prevalent law regarding police
officers injured during commutes, in police vehicles, is that compensation should be
awarded. He notes:
[l]t has been recognized that police officers are 'on call' in a special sense.
That is, while the usual on-call employee is subject to the possibility of a
specific summons emanating directly from the employer, the police officer
may at any moment be 'called' into duty by the events taking place in the
officer's presence, whether technically off duty or not. Awards have
accordingly been made to officers injured in the course of an ordinary going
or coming journey.
Arthur Larson and Lex Larson. Larson's Workers Compensation LawS14.05[7] (Rel.
83-11/99).
Petitioner has acknowledged that "other states have fielded this issue," but
then goes on to selectively cite only three cases, which are in the minority, not on
point factually, and ignores the overwhelming weight of authority that such injuries
are indeed compensable. Petitioner makes no effort to apply those cases to the
specific facts herein, or to even explain why the minority view that it cites should be
adopted by this Court.
Petitioner's reliance on Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 2002 UT 4,73 P. 3d
315 (UT 2003) in particular, is misplaced. First, Ahlstrom was not a workers'
compensation case, but rather involved an issue of third party liability. The Supreme
Court, in that case, was careful to indicate its decision should not be misinterpreted
as applying to workers' compensation cases. During the course of its opinion, the
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Court explained:
Attempting to augment the coming and going rule, the Ahlstroms also
argue that the "special errand" and "employer-provided transportation"
exceptions to the rule should be imported from our worker's
compensation jurisprudence and applied to negligence cases like this
one. However, cases addressing workers' compensation rules, even
when the issues are the same, are of little use in answering the
question now before us. ]d. at 317.
The Court further emphasized this factor in its footnote to that declaration:
Although the coming and going rule was imported from our workers'
compensation jurisprudence, we note that such portability, while
sometimes appropriate, is not the rule in Utah.
Scope of employment questions are inherently fact bound. The scope
of employment question arises in both workers' compensation and
negligence cases but the method by which the question is answered is
markedly different. We have said that the Workers' Compensation Act
'should be liberally construed and applied to provide coverage. Any
doubt respecting the right of compensation will be resolved in favor of
the injured employee.' . . . Negligence cases require proof by the
preponderance of the evidence that the employee was acting within the
scope of employment. With very different presumptions governing
workers' compensation and negligence cases, it would not be wise to
hold that the rules governing scope of employment questions in one
area are wholly applicable to the other because the legal effect of
identical facts may be different in a negligence case than in a workers
compensation case. jd. at 317.
Second, In Ahlstrom. the Utah Supreme Court was called upon to review a
Partial Summary Judgment, in which it was required to consider the facts in a light
most favorable to Salt Lake City, the party against whom the judgment as to liability
had been granted. Conversely, in a workers' compensation case, the law is to be
liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits and any doubt as to coverage is to
be resolved in favor of the injured worker. (See also Point I above).
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In Montgomery County. Maryland v. Wade. 345 Md. 1, 690 A. 2d 990 (Md.
App., 1997), the Maryland Court of Appeals considered a program under a "PPV" or
"personal patrol vehicle" program, extremely similar to Salt Lake County's. The
Court upheld workers' compensation benefits awarded to Officer Wade for injuries
sustained while operating her patrol vehicle, with the required equipment, and while
monitoring her radio, as required, although she was off duty, not in her uniform, and
on her way to her grandmother's house, with her grandmother as a passenger.
As the Court explained, that program placed stringent regulations on those
under the program including the obligation that the off-duty officers must:
[c]arry a handgun, handcuffs, and department credentials, and equip the PPV
with items such as flares [etc]. . . They must monitor the police radio, and
may make traffic stops 'only when inaction would reflect unfavorably upon the
department.' They must 'respond to incidents or calls for service which come
to their attention through any of the following means: (1) on view; (2) citizens;
(3) radio monitored activity of a serious nature occurring within reasonable
proximity to their location.' kL at 992.
The Maryland Court also noted the restrictions imposed under the program
against the use of such vehicles for political purposes, secondary employment, use
of bumper stickers, and various other activities, also similar to those imposed in the
case presently before this Court.
Based upon those factors, the Court upheld the determination that the injuries
arose out of her employment because:
Officer Wade's use of her P P V . . . was clearly incidental to her role as
a patrol officer. T h e . . . department established a program whereby its
officers were permitted to use their patrol cruisers as personal vehicles
when not on regularly scheduled duty. It attached numerous and
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detailed regulations to this privilege and encouraged off-duty use of the
PPVs in order to, inter alia, alleviate budget and staffing concerns and
increase police presence throughout the County. Officer Wade would
not have been operating a PPV but for her employment and consequent
participation in the program. Thus, because her injuries stem from her
use of the PPV within the department's guidelines, the requisite causal
link exists, and, under these circumstances, those injuries are properly
considered to have arisen from her employment. ]a\ at 994.
The Court then considered the second part of the question, as to whether she
was acting in the "course of employment" at the time of the accident. The Court
explained that this required her to be "performing those duties or engaged in
something incident thereto" or she may not recover. The Court, again noting the
guidelines and strictures imposed upon her by the employer whenever she was
operating the PPV off duty, explained:
The guidelines, in essence, outline additional responsibilities by which
the participating officers are to abide upon penalty of, at minimum,
expulsion from the program. Any time Officer Wade placed the vehicle
in operation while she was not on scheduled duty, she was bound to act
within those guidelines. Taking this view, she may, therefore, properly
be considered to have been operating the PPV under the auspices of
the department at the time of the accident and, thus, within the course
of her employment. |a\ at 995.
The Court specifically rejected the assertions of the County that the officer was
not performing any police duty at the time of, or leading up to the accident and was
therefore precluded from recovery by prior state case law. The Court continued:
Upon entry into the vehicle, Officer Wade was required to abide by the
program's numerous regulations. She was required to stop in particular
circumstances or in response to calls for service. The duties and
responsibilities concomitant to use of a PPV are in addition to those
expected of a nonparticipating officer. As in Perry, this fact in no way
lessens the work-related nature of a participating officer's use of a PPV.
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*

The County seems to intimate that, if the 'work' being performed is not
required, injuries sustained in the performance thereof are not
compensable, for failing to satisfy the requisite nexus. Certainly, a
participating officer is not required to use the PPV while off duty, but
the County developed the program precisely for such use in furtherance
of its objectives . . . By its assertions and assessment of the
compensability of Officer Wade's claim, the County appears
affirmatively to disregard the department's motivation in providing the
vehicles to the officers in the first instance. This belies traditional
analysis of what is considered to be within the course of employment.
Thus, while the County may be correct in stating that its off-duty
officers are not required to operate their PPV's while off duty, if and
when they do, they are performing a police function and should be
compensated under the Act for any injuries sustained pursuant thereto."
ja\ at 997.
Maryland's decision in this regard are not alone. Other states, similarly
recognizing the general application of the "going and coming rule," have still
awarded officers workers' compensation benefits under similar circumstances.
In Tiqhev. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept. 110 Nev. 632, 877 P. 2d 1032
(Nev., 1994), an undercover officer was injured while driving home after dinner with
fellow officers, where they discussed their activities and anticipated future actions.
The officer was on call, carrying a police beeper and driving an undercover Metro
vehicle equipped with police radio. The Court noted that the "going and coming rule"
does not apply under such circumstances to preclude workers' compensation
benefits. As the Court explained:
First, an employee may still be within the course of his or her
employment when the travel to or from work confers a distinct benefit
upon the employer. . . Tighe was driving home in his employer's
vehicle and was subject to his employer's control at the time of the
accident. The police radio and beeper provided a means for Metro to
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summon Tighe in a time of need, and Metro benefitted from having one
of its undercover officers driving in an undercover vehicle
(T)here
is substantial evidence in the administrative record to find that Tighe's
injuries occurred within the course of his employment. Tighe was on
call and driving a police vehicle equipped with a police radio, and he
was prepared to respond to any public emergency he may have
encountered. Id at 1035.
In City of Springfield v. Industrial Commission. 244 III. App.3d 408, 614 N. E.
2d 30 (III. App., 1999) benefits were awarded to a uniformed and armed officer
injured while returning from lunch at home in an unmarked squad car provided for
his use 24 hours a day, with a police radio in the car required to be activated at all
times, and with a beeper. The Court explained:
In this case, although claimant was not responding to any particular call
or emergency, he had his police radio activated pursuant to department
directive at the time the accident occurred. This serves to distinguish
this case from those cited by respondent... In this case claimant was
returning to duty after lunch and was not only subject to being 'on call';
he had his radio turned on and was 'on call' to the extent he would have
responded in the normal course to any request for assistance or
emergency he encountered.
In this sense, claimant was not acting outside his employment-related
duties or engaged in a purely personal diversion or enterprise. The
principal issue, as we have indicated, was whether the employer, under
all the circumstances, can be deemed to have retained authority over
the employee. Actively monitoring the police radio during the course
of claimant's return trip to the station is sufficient evidence upon which
the Commission could draw the conclusion that the employer intended
to retain authority over claimant at the time his injuries arose.
Accordingly, the Commission's decision is not against the manifest
weight of evidence. 1<± at 480.
During the course of its decision, the Illinois Court found that the earlier Siens
v. Industrial Commission. 418 N.E.2d 749 (III., 1981) and Wolland v. Industrial
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Commission. 434 N.E.2d 1132 (III., 1982) cases from that jurisdiction were not
applicable because they were not performing any job-related duties at the time of the
accident, whereas the officer in the current case was not merely subject to "call" but
"had his radio turned on and was 'on call' to the extent he would have responded in
the normal course to any request for assistance or emergency he encountered."
In Botke v. County of Chippewa. 210 Mich. App. 66, 533 N.W. 2d 7 (Mich.
App., 1995) benefits were awarded to an officer injured while traveling home, in
uniform, in radio contact with the department, and driving a fully equipped patrol car.
The Court recognized its prior decision in Chambo v. City of Detroit. 269 N.W.2d
243 (Mich. App., 1978) where benefits had been denied. The Court explained,
however, that Chambo was decided under "the narrow facts" of that case. The Court
then explained:
The facts of the present case support the contrary conclusion. At the
time of this accident, defendant Chippewa County clearly received a
benefit from plaintiffs operation of the county's only active on-road
patrol vehicle. Although the road traveled by plaintiff was mostly rural
in character, the county received the benefit of deterrence of traffic
violations by virtue of the presence of the marked patrol vehicle.
Furthermore, although plaintiff was officially off duty, he was expected
to respond to any incidents observed by him that necessitated law
enforcement intervention. He remained in radio contact with defendant
and was subject to immediate dispatch. Under these circumstances,
we hold that the dual-purpose rule applies . . . Jd. at 8.
In State of Delaware v. Glascock. 1997 DE 18262 (Superior Ct, Sussex,
1997) death benefits were awarded for an Internal Affairs investigator for the
Department of Corrections who was killed driving home in a state owned vehicle
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equipped with a cellular phone and state police radio, which he was only allowed to
use for work and driving to and from home. The Court explained that the going and
coming rule did not bar that recovery and explained that, while it was not certain
where he was headed at the time of the accident, even if he was heading home the
recovery was still not barred because he:
[W]as subject to unanticipated disruption at any time by the demands
of his job. In addition to always wearing a beeper, he drove a Stateowned car with a police radio only when driving to and from work or
when responding to a call. The presence of the police radio made him
even more accessible to the Employer when he was going to or coming
from work
The combination of these factors makes it clear that the
relationship between Glascock's on-call responsibilities and his
employment was sufficiently close to support the Board's finding that
Glascock was in the course of his employment at the time of his death,
jd, at 84.
In John Collier v. County Nassau. 1974 N.Y. 44576, 362 N.Y.S. 2d 52 (N.Y.
APP, 1974) benefits were awarded to a police sergeant injured while a passenger
with two other policemen in a police vehicle assigned to his unit. It was used for an
extended period to travel between home and department, and he was often called
to drive from home to a particular assignment area. The Court explained:
Where the use of the employer's vehicle has been used by the
employee over a period of time with the employer's consent and for the
employer's benefit, the operation of the vehicle was directly related to
the employment, and any injury occurring during such operation does
arise out of and in the course of his employment, jd, at 53.
In City of Sherwood v. Lowe, 4 Ark. App. 161, 628 S.W. 2d 610 (Ark. App.,
1982) benefits were similarly awarded to an officer for injuries received off-duty
when he was armed and in uniform but off-duty, operating his personal motorcycle
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equipped with police lights within his jurisdiction, even despite the absence of a
police radio. The Court explained:
The City of Sherwood derived a benefit from his presence on the city
streets in uniform and operating the police-equipped vehicle. This
benefit is not so tenuous as to require denial of coverage by workers'
compensation. |g\ at 615.
In Carrillo v. Workers Compensation Appeals Board. 197 Cal. Rptr. 425,149
Cal. App.3d 1177 (Cal. App., 1983), the denial of an award of benefits was annulled
by the Court with directions to grant the Petition for Reconsideration. There, a
reserve officer was injured while driving to work from home in her private car, in her
sheriffs uniform and badge, but without a sidearm, which would otherwise have been
required to be locked up when she arrived at the Women's Honor Farm. The Court
explained:
If petitioner had observed any police matter other than a traffic
infraction while driving to or from work, she was required by her
employer's regulation to take appropriate action. Since petitioner was
in full uniform, criminals as well as citizens in need of assistance would
know upon observation that she was a law enforcement officer. id. at
427.
Finally, In Mineral County v. Industrial Commission. 649 P.2d 728 (Colo. App.,
1982) the Court upheld a Commission decision awarding benefits, despite
arguments that the "to and from work" rule barred recovery, for an officer who drove
to a restaurant in his official car, in uniform, after serving some papers, stopped for
a short period at the Elk's club and was subsequently found lying on the sidewalk in
front of the club's steps. The Court acknowledged it had previously stated in Rogers
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v. Industrial Commission. 574 P. 2d 116 (Colo. App., 1978), that the officer's
injuries were not compensable because "[t]he controlling factor is whether, at the
time of the accident, the officer was actually engaged in the performance of law
enforcement activities."
However, the Court declared that "Rogers is distinguishable from the instant
case" because of the "totality of the circumstances," including the fact that he was
in uniform and was returning to his official car furnished by the employer, as well as
the fact that he was the only member of that County's sheriffs department and could
even be reached at home by sheriffs radio or telephone at any time of the day or
night.
Petitioner repeatly makes the claim that at time of his accident Mr. Alexander
was "... no different from the thousands of commuters enduring Salt Lake County
rush-hour in their drive to work" and that "The only connection the Sheriffs Office that
Alexander had at the time of the accident was that he was occupying a Sheriffs
Office vehicle." (Petitioner's Brief at 6). In order to make this naive assertion,
Petitioner has to overlook substantial evidence found by the Labor Commission.
The fact is that on the date in question, Mr. Alexander was far different from
the other commuters. He was a sworn and highly trained Sheriffs Officer with
approximately 28 years of experience. He was required by Salt Lake County to be
monitoring the official police radio and to respond to violations of the law and
emergencies. He had, in fact, done so on several occasions in the past. He was on-
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call, ready for action.
He was not a private citizen driving his private vehicle. He was in an
unmarked, but official Salt Lake County Sheriff's vehicle. The vehicle was fully
equipped as a police car with a siren, deck lights and a police radio. It was also
equipped with a rifle, shotgun and a handgun. Mr. Alexander was required to wear
or keep in the vehicle his Sheriffs Office identification, uniform and citation book, all
of which he had. He was not free to use the vehicle, like any private citizen could
their own personal vehicle, as Salt Lake County imposed strict controls on where,
when and how the vehicle could be used.
For example, only Mr. Alexander was authorized to operate the vehicle. It
could not be driven outside of Salt Lake County. He could not use the vehicle for
recreational or vacation trips or for any other purpose or activity which would be
inconsistent with the Officer's obligation to respond to emergencies. He could not
use the vehicle if he, or any passenger had consumed alcohol within the previous six
hours. In addition, even his clothing and grooming while driving the vehicle was
controlled, with restrictions on certain attire and "day old beards."
A Sheriffs vehicle was not provided to Mr. Alexander by Salt Lake County out
of largess or as a fringe benefit of his employment. Rather, the County derived a
significant benefit, supported by sound public policy, by having its Officers constantly
driving fully equipped Sheriff's vehicle and available to respond to calls at a
moments notice.

Through this Policy, the County benefitted from having an
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increased number of Officers on the streets, faster response time and greater police
availability, as well as the benefit of having an unmarked car on the road - an
advantage in certain situations.
Under these facts, Mr. Alexander was hardly like the "thousands of
commuters enduring Salt Lake County rush-hour in their drive to work." His special
on-call status as a police officer, the nature and type of vehicle he was operating and
the control and obligations imposed upon him by Salt Lake County all operate to
take him out of the general "going and coming" rule and bring him within the purview
of the Workers Compensation Act.
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Mr. Alexander's injuries were suffered in the course and scope of his
employment with the Petitioner.

He was engaged in actions which materially

benefitted his employer and such activities created a proper basis for the award of
compensation as was made in this case. The Order of the Utah Labor Commission
below, should be affirmed.
DATED this 21st day of June, 2006.

Brian Kelm
Counsel for Steven A. Alexander
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Addendum A
Utah Code Annotated, § 34A-2-401 (1999)

34A-2-401.

Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid.

(1) An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in
the course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid:
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death;
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for:
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services;
(ii) medicines; and
(iii) in case of death, the amount of funeral expenses.
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and
hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this
chapter shall be:
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance carrier; and
(b) not on the employee.
(3) Payment of benefits provided by this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act, shall commence within 30 calendar days after any
final award by the commission.
Amended by Chapter 55, 1999 General

Addendum B
Order Denying Motion for Review
Appeals Board
Utah Labor Commission
February 13,2006

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
TELEPHONE 801-530-6800

STEVEN A. ALEXANDER,

*

Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

*
Case No. 200389

vs.

*
*

Judge Lorrie Lima

SALT LAKE COUNTY,
Respondent.

*
*
*

The above-entitled matter was heard before Debbie L. Hann, Administrative Law Judge,
Utah Labor Commission, on October 23,2003. The petitioner was represented by Brian Kelm, Esq.
The respondent was represented by John Soltis, Esq. and T.J. Tsakalos, Esq.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

^
V

c
The petitioner, Steven A. Alexander, filed an Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor
Commission on January 9, 2003, and claimed entitlement to medical expenses, recommended
medical care, temporary total compensation, permanent partial compensation, travel expenses and
interest. The petitioner's claim for workers compensation benefits arose out of an alleged industrial
accident that occurred on November 7, 2001. The respondent's denied that the accident on
November 7, 2001, arose out of and in the course of the petitioner's employment.
On April 16,2004, Judge Hann issued a Findings of Fact and Interim Order and referred the
issue of medical causation to a Labor Commission medical panel. On August 12,2004, the medical
panel issued a report. A copy of the medical panel's report was mailed to the parties. No party filed
an objection to the report and it is admitted into the evidence pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2601.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Employment.

The petitioner was employed by the respondent as a deputy sheriff in the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office. On November 7, 2001, the petitioner's average weekly wage was $1,338.50. He
was married with one dependent child. The petitioner's weekly workers compensation rate was
$554.00 for temporary total compensation and $369.00 for permanent partial compensation.
2.

Respondent's Policy Regarding Sheriffs Office Vehicles.

Alexander v. Salt Lake County
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Case No. 200389
Page 2
The Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office issued a written policy setting forth regulations
governing vehicles issued to deputy sheriffs. Exhibit R-12. The policy stated in part that:
Travel time will not be counted as time worked. This does not relieve a sworn
employee from an obligation to check on the air or respond to a law enforcement
situation. . . . 2-5-03.03(1 )(4).
**********

Office vehicles and equipment are issued to members for the use in the performance
of their duties. It is the obligation of all members exercising control of these assets to
safeguard them and use them within the limits of policy and good judgement. 2-801.00.
*********

Deputy Sheriffs . . . assigned Sheriff's Office vehicles are subject to the following
restrictions:
(a) Vehicles will not be used for recreational or vacation trips.
(e) Vehicles will not used for activities manifestly inconsistent with the obligation to
respond to emergencies, such as heavy loads, objects protruding from windows
or trunk, etc.
(f) Vehicles may not be used for secondary employment purposes, except as
transportation to and from the work site, except as otherwise authorized by Sheriff's
Office policy. 2-8-02-04(2).
**********
Deputies will carry the following equipment with them in the vehicle at all times:
(a) an authorized firearm.
(b) Sheriff's Office identification.
(c) a flashlight
(d) a Utility Uniform
(e) a citation book and
(f) flares.
2-8-02.04(4).
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Dr. Beck released the petitioner to light duty on July 23, 2002, and he determined that the
petitioner was medically stable on February 11, 2003. Medical exhibit 321 and 329. On June 30,
2003, Dr. Beck assigned to the petitioner's right shoulder a four percent whole person impairment
rating. Dr. Beck apportioned 50% of the petitioner's impairment to his pre-existing condition, or two
percent whole person, and two percent whole person due to the November 2001, motor vehicle
accident. Medical exhibit 331.
In a September 17, 2002, letter to Salt Lake County Risk Management, Dr. Beck noted the
petitioner's right shoulder symptoms significantly worsened following the November 2001, motor
vehicle accident. He opined that at least 50% of the petitioner's right shoulder condition was the
result of the accident. Medical exhibit 325-326.
On September 22,2003, Dr. Richard Knoebel conducted an independent medical evaluation
of the petitioner. Dr. Knoebel opined the petitioner's November 7,2001, motor vehicle accident was
not the cause of his right shoulder condition. Dr. Knoebel based his opinion, in part, on the
petitioner's delay in seeking medical treatment following the accident. Dr. Knoebel assigned to the
petitioner's right shoulder a five percent upper extremity impairment rating. Medical exhibit 358-370.
On October 14,2003, Dr. Ronald Ruff performed a review of the petitioner's medical records
for the respondent. Dr. Ruff noted that "...it is impossible to say that these shoulder problems were
not exacerbated by the accidents." Medical exhibit 356.
On June 2, 2004, the Labor Commission medical panel opined that, in teims of
reasonable medical probability, there was a medically demonstrable causal connection between
the petitioner's right shoulder condition and the motor vehicle accident on November 7, 2001.
The medical panel further opined the treatment the petitioner received for his right shoulder
condition since November 7, 2001, was reasonable and necessary to treat his injury due to the
motor vehicle accident. The medical panel assessed to the petitioner's right shoulder condition
a five percent permanent physical impairment rating. It apportioned two percent whole person,
of the impairment rating, to the petitioner's pre-existing condition and three percent whole person
to the November 7, 2001, motor vehicle accident. The medical panel concluded that the
petitioner was not malingering and he had a normal mental status.
6.

Temporary Total Compensation.

It is undisputed that the petitioner missed work due to his right shoulder condition. The
petitioner had right shoulder surgery on March 6, 2002, and he returned to work on August 6,
2002.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The November 7, 2001, Accident and Scope of Employment.

Section 34A-2-401(1) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides that an employee
who is injured by accident "arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment... shall
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be paid compensation." Travel to and from work is not generally considered to be "in the course of.
. . employment." Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985).
in Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., the Court of Appeals cited the Utah
Supreme Court and held:
The major premise of the going and coming rule is that it is unfair to impose
unlimited liability on an employer for conduct of its employees over which it has not
control and from which it derives no benefit. Therefore, the major focus in
determining whether or not the general rule should apply in a given case is on the
benefit the employer receives and his control over the conduct.
In the present case, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates the respondent's
policy imposed substantial control and obligation on the petitioner both on and off duty. Although
the policy allowed the petitioner to use his assigned sheriff's vehicle when off-duty, he could not use
it for recreational or vacation trips or secondary employment, other than to and from the work site.
The policy required the petitioner to monitor the police radio when operating the vehicle and respond
to a law enforcement situation even if he was not on duty. On the day of the motor vehicle accident,
the petitioner was dressed for work and he carried the mandated sheriffs equipment in the vehicle.
The petitioner operated the vehicle as the policy proscribed including monitoring the sheriff's radio in
the areas he traveled. Finally, the petitioner provided a visual law enforcement presence in the local
community. The sheriffs vehicle was an instrumentality of the Sheriffs Office at all hours of the day
and night when the petitioner operated it. Thus, the petitioner was performing for his employer a
substantial service required by the respondent's policy.
Based on the foregoing, the petitioner suffered an accident arising out of and in the course of
his employment. The benefit the petitioner provided to the respondent was substantial both on and
off duty when he operated his assigned sheriffs vehicle. Furthermore, the respondent had
substantial control in the manner in which the petitioner operated the sheriffs vehicle both on and off
duty.
2.

Medical Causation of Petitioner's Right Shoulder Condition.

The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the petitioner sustained a preexisting
injury to his right shoulder in fall 2000, for which he received medical treatment. Therefore, the
petitioner is held to a higher legal standard under Allen v. Industrial Commission.
The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that on November 7,2001, the petitioner
was involved in a severe industrial accident when sheriffs vehicle that he was driving was rear
ended on a freeway. A medical demonstrable causal connection existed between the petitioner's
right shoulder condition and the industrial accident on November 7, 2001. The medical treatment
the petitioner received for his right shoulder condition since November 7,2001, was reasonable and
necessary to treat his right shoulder condition due to the industrial accident.
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Based on the foregoing, the petitioner suffered an injury that was caused by an industrial
accident on November 7, 2001.
3.

Temporary Total Compensation.

The petitioner missed a total of 21.6 weeks of work due to the industrial injury he sustained
on November 7, 2001.
4.

Permanent Partial Compensation.

The preponderance of the evidence, based on an impartial medical panel, demonstrates that
the petitioner suffered a five percent whole person physical impairment of his right shoulder. Two
percent of the five percent whole person rating was apportioned to the petitioner's pre-existing
condition. Three percent of the five percent whole person rating was apportioned to the petitioner's
industrial accident.
5.

Travel Expenses.

The petitioner provided no evidence concerning his travel expenses associated with the
medical treatment for his industrially caused injuries.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondent shall pay the petitioner temporary total
compensation at the rate of $554.00 per week for 21.6 weeks, for a total of $11,966.40, less
attorney's fees to Brian Kelm, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-410. That amount is accrued,
due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §34A-2-420(3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-1-5.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall pay the petitioner permanent partial
compensation for a three percent impairment rating at the rate of $369.00 per week, for 9.36 weeks,
for a total of $3,453.84, less attorney's fees to Mr. Kelm, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-412.
That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per
annum, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-420(3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-1-5.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents shall pay all medical expenses reasonably
related to the petitioner's industrial accident of November 7, 2001, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§34A-2-418, and the medical and surgical fee schedule of the Utah Labor Commission, and any
travel allowances hereinafter incurred, pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-20, plus
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-420(3) and Utah
Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-13.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents shall pay the statutory attorneys' fees of
$3,084.05, plus twenty percent (20%) of the interest awarded herein, directly to Mr. Kelm pursuant to
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Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-309 and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 602-2-4. That amount shall be
deducted from the petitioner's award and sent directly to the office of Mr. Kelm.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petitioner's claim for travel expenses is dismissed with
prejudice.
DATED THIS 22nd day of February 2005.
UTAH LABOR C Q ^ S S I Q N

LORRIE-tfMA v
Administrative Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
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the following addresses:
Brian Kelm Esq
350 S 400 E Ste 122-W
Salt Lake City UT 84111
John P. Soltis
2001 So State St Suites S 3400
Salt Lake City UT 84190
T J Tsakalos
2001 So State St Suites S 3400
Salt Lake City UT 84190
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Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615

Addendum C
Salt Lake County Policy 2-8-00.00
"Vehicles and Equipment"

CHAPTER EIGHT
2-8-00.00

VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT

2-8-01.00

GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES
(1)

Office vehicles and equipment are issued to members for use in the performance of their
duties. It is the obligation of all members exercising control of these assets to safeguard
them and use them within the limits of policy and good judgement.

(2)

Any member who is responsible for the loss, theft, or destruction of Office vehicles and
equipment, beyond normal usage, due to the member's misconduct, incompetence, or
negligence may be disciplined.

(3)

Members will not alter or attach equipment to the existing wiring system. Changes in
uniform wiring may only be done with the authorization of the member's Division
Commander and the concurrence of the Communications Division Commander.
Unauthorized changes may result in discipline.

(4)

Window tinting beyond factory specifications is not permitted except in circumstances
where investigative needs require same. Approval for tinting must be approved by the
members Division Commander.

2-8-02.00

VEHICLES

2-8-02.01

Vehicle Unit Number

2-8-02.02

(1)

All Office vehicles are assigned "unit numbers" for identification purposes.

(2)

Unit numbers shall be used whenever identification of the vehicle is necessary.

Fuel
State of Utah Fuel Network
(1)

To obtain fuel, each vehicle has been assigned a "gas card". Each individual fuel user has
been assigned a "P.I.N. Number". Fuel may be obtained by following the directions at the
terminal of any State of Utah Fuel Network station. A list o( authorized stations is
available from the Sheriffs Fleet Management Unit.
(a)

(2)

Any questions or problems with the fuel system may be directed to 1-800-6783440 or 1-801-538-3440, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

Other Fuel Services
(a)

Emergency purchase of gas or oil will be paid for by the member and a receipt
obtained for petty cash reimbursement.

(b)

2-8-02.03

The State of Utah Fuel Network Gas Card may be used outside the County
consistent with SOPPM 2-8-02.04. Authorized stations are listed in the State of
Utah Fuel Network pamphlet. The pamphlet is available from the Sheriffs Fleet
Management Unit.
Washing Vehicles
(I)

Office vehicles will be kept clean and orderly. Members shall, however, use good
judgement and wash cars only as frequently as is actually necessary.

(2)

Designated commercial car washes will be used.

2-8-02.04

Use of Vehicle
(1)

All use of Sheriff s Office vehicles will be consistent with provisions of this policv.

(2)

Deputy Sheriffs and other members who are assigned Sheriffs Office vehicles are
subject to the following restrictions:
(a)

Vehicles will not be used for recreational or vacation trips.

(b)

Vehicles will not be used outside Salt Lake County without Division
Commander approval.

(c)

Vehicles will not be used outside Utah without the Sheriffs and County
Commission approval.

(d)

Vehicles will not be used by deputies or passengers who are legally
intoxicated or have consumed alcoholic beverages in the previous 6 hours.
No alcoholic beverage will be transported except for official business.

(e)

Vehicles will not be used for activities manifestly inconsistent with the
obligation to respond to emergencies, such as heavy loads, objects
protruding from windows or trunk, etc.

(f)

Vehicles may not be used for secondary employment purposes, except as
transportation to and from the work site, except as otherwise authorized by
Sheriffs Office policy.

(g)

Vehicles will only be operated by authorized Sheriffs Office members.

(3)

Members are responsible for the proper care of an assigned Sheriffs Office vehicle.
Maintenance of assigned vehicles by Fair Labor Standards Act (FLS A) non-exempt
employees will be made on-duty, whenever practical.

(4)

Deputies will carry the following equipment with them in the vehicle at all times:

(5)

(a)

an authorized firearm

(b)

Sheriffs Office identification

(c)

a flashlight

(d)

a Utility Uniform

(e)

a citation book, and

(f)

flares.

When off-duty, deputies may dress appropriate for their activities. If such dress is
inappropriate to represent the Office in an emergency response, the Utility Uniform
will be worn.
(a)

Deputies shall not dress in any way that could bring discredit to the
Sheriffs Office, i.e. tank tops, reversed ball caps, earrings, day old beards,
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2-8-02.05

(6)

When using Sheriffs Office vehicles off-duty, deputies will keep the police radio on
and monitor radio traffic. If in the vicinity- of an Ln-progress crime or other emergency,
the deputy will respond The deputy will notify Dispatch of such response. Such
responses will be made without non-peace officer passengers.

(7)

Off-duty deputies will park and operate Sheriffs Office vehicles legally and will be
responsible for any citation received.

(8)

Unattended vehicles will be kept locked at all times All weapons will be removed from
the vehicle while it is being serviced.

(9)

Deputies on vacation leave in excess of 5 days, restricted duty, leave without pay, or
suspension will coordinate the use of Sheriffs Office vehicles with their Division
Commander.

(10)

Whenradiotransmissions are required, and the deputy does not have a car number, the
deputy's MIS number will be used.

Seat belts. Air bags and Transporting Passengers
(1)

Seat belts
Members are required to wear seat belts at all dmes when operating or riding in County
vehicles. Members are required to insure that all passengers, including persons in
custody, are seat belted when in County vehicles.

(2)

2-8-02.06

Air bag Guidelines
(a)

Drivers should wear the seat belt correctly, position themselves approximately
12 inches back from the steering wheel, and keep hands to the sides of the
steering wheel at the 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions.

(b)

Adult passengers seated in the front seat should wear the seat belt correcdy,
and position the seat as far back as it will adjust to.

(c)

Children should ride properly restrained in the back seat whenever possible.
Rear facing child seats should never be used in the front seat of a car equipped
with a passenger side air bag. All child seats are best used in the rear seat. If
a forward facing child seat must be used in die front seat, it should be properly
secured and the seat should be moved all the way back. If older children (not
using a child restraint device) must ride in the front seat, make sure they are
always properly belted and the seat is moved back as far as possible.

Inspections
Division Commanders or immediate supervisors shall inspect the vehicles assigned under their
command or supervision on a monthly basis, using the Vehicle Inspection Report.

Revised! 1-12-96
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2-8-02.07

Preventative Maintenance (?M)
(1)

2-8-02.08

The manufacturers of Office vehicles give instructions in warranties that diese vehicles
must be maintained according to a specified schedule.
(a)

Patrol vehicles will be PM'd even/ 3000 miles.

(b)

Other vehicles will be PM'd every 4000 miles or three months.

(2)

When the vehicle is serviced, a sticker will be placed in the vehicle indicating the due
date of the next PM.

(3)

PM servicing is the responsibility of the assigned member. If a vehicle is driven by two
or more members, the day shift member will be responsible.

(4)

Vehicles shall be safety and emission control inspected annually in compliance with
State law.

Vehicle Repair

2-8-02.09

(1)

Vehicle Maintenance shall supervise the repair of Sheriffs Office vehicles.

(2)

When repair needs are detected in a vehicle, the assigned member will notify' Vehicle
Maintenance and arrange for the vehicle to be received by Public Works.

(3)

This shall be the responsibility of the day shift member in situations where die car is
assigned to two or more members.

(4)

When a vehicle has been repaired, Vehicle Maintenance will test die vehicle and will
thereafter notify the member that the unit is available. If the vehicle is a Patrol unit, the
supervisor will be notified instead of the member.

(5)

V/hen emergency repairs are required and are obtained, Vehicle Maintenance will be
notified by memorandum.

Wrecker Use
(1)

Towed County vehicles will be delivered to Public Works.

(2)

Dispatch will call a wrecker contracted to tow County vehicles. If a wrecker is not
immediately available, the supervisor shall make arrangements to store the vehicle in
a safe place until such time as die wrecker is available.

(3)

If the County contract wrecker is not available and the County vehicle must be towed
from the scene, it may be picked up by a close commercial wrecker and stored until
picked up by the County wrecker, as authorized by the supervisor.

2-8-02.10

Line Units
When a member needs a replacement vehicle because of repairs, etc., a line-car may be checked
out from Public Works, if available.
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